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1 Introduction
This paper produces a structure in which the eﬀects of anticipated inflation on a wide variety of long
run economic variables (including the distribution of income) can be meaningfully studied. It develops
a neoclassical model of capital accumulation in which inflation aﬀects the payoﬀs to economic agents in
financial markets, which in turn impacts upon their incomes and well-being via its eﬀect on long-run
real activity in the economy. It represents a first attempt at a tractable analysis of how inflation aﬀects
the distribution of income especially in the modern general-equilibrium optimizing-agent paradigm.
To that end, a neoclassical growth model is constructed in which some capital investment must be
partially externally financed, and external finance is subject to a standard costly state verification (CSV)
problem.1 Some fraction of the population is entrepreneurs (capitalists), who have access to a risky but
high return capital production technology. Successful capitalists leave bequests to their oﬀspring which
are then used by the latter to internally fund some part of their own investment projects. However,
some external finance is also required and this is provided by a financial intermediary that pools the
young labor income of workers and makes loans on their behalf. All contracts are set up in real terms.
There is also a government which conducts monetary policy by printing money and by imposing legal
restrictions on currency holdings. In particular, a given fraction of the deposit base of the intermediary
must be held in the form of return-dominated currency. Even though inflation is perfectly anticipated,
it can have real eﬀects in the economy via the eﬀect it has on the real returns to lending activities.
More specifically, inflation forces the intermediary to charge a inflation premium so that it can preserve
the real value of its payoﬀ from lending.
In the setting described above, it is well-understood that the greater the ability of capitalists to
provide internal finance, the less severe is the CSV problem. Thus bequests help mitigate the severity
of the contracting friction and thereby promote credit market eﬃciency and capital formation. The
inflation premium charged by the intermediary erodes the incomes of the entrepreneurs, thereby reducing
their bequests (future collateral), raising agency costs, and worsening credit market eﬃciency. The
binding reserve requirement also serves to reduce the supply of loanable funds into the credit market
thereby reducing credit market activity. On the one hand, the transfer to the young capitalists reduces
their need for external funds thereby reducing the severity of the information friction (a reduction in
aggregate monitoring costs). On the other hand, the government transfer to young workers removes
the eﬀect of the reserve requirement, restoring their savings to a level identical to what is was in the
benchmark setting with no money.
We go onto study four diﬀerent nested models depending on the treatment accorded to any seignior-
age revenue that is collected by the government. These are a) the model with no reserve requirement,
and hence no seigniorage, b) the model with no transfers (where the seigniorage may be thought of
as being discarded), c) the model where the seigniorage is entirely rebated to the workers, and finally
d) the model where all the transfers go to the capitalists. By construction, the benchmark model is
the one with no money. Numerical computations reveal that the average monitoring probability, an
estimate of the economy-wide “bankruptcy probability” rises in each case, but the level is the lower
in the transfers-to-capitalist regime than in the transfers-to-workers regime. Transfers to capitalists
enhance their internal finance and this reduces their probability of being monitored.
Within each regime, inflation causes a decline in real activity.2 The decline is lowest in the transfers-
to-workers regime because the transfer to the workers essentially nullifies the deleterious eﬀect of a
binding reserve requirement. There is still a small decline because even when the amount of loanable
1The literature has established a strong positive relationship between bank lending activity and long-run real economic
performance [see King and Levine, 1993 for example].
2On average, sustained high rates of inflation are known to be detrimental to long-run economic performance as discussed
in Huybens and Smith (1999).
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funds is restored to the benchmark level, higher inflation continues to erode the incomes of capitalists
via its eﬀect on the real return on loans. Relative to the regime in which all seigniorage is discarded, the
capital stock is far higher in either the transfers-to-capitalist regime or the transfers-to-workers regime.
It is interesting to note that inflation increases the income inequality (measured by the gini co-
eﬃcient) among all capitalists in each regime. Curiously, the eﬀect of inflation on income inequality
among capitalists is most muted in the transfers-to-workers regime. Similarly, the income gap be-
tween capitalists and workers (the ratio of average capitalist income to the wage rate) is highest in
the transfers-to-capitalist regime when compared to the transfers-to-workers regime. The welfare of
workers, not surprisingly, is highest in the transfers-to-workers regime. The numerical analysis indi-
cates that the supply of loanable funds is, in some sense, more important for capital formation when
compared to policy-induced reductions in economy-wide agency costs. Finally, at least from a steady
state comparison view-point, it appears that the worker regime is “superior” to the capitalist regime in
that it produces a less-unequal income distribution (both within capitalists and across capitalists and
workers) without compromising on capital formation.
In keeping with the spirit of Romer and Romer (1998), the above results also suggest a new long run
role for predictable monetary policy, namely, reducing income inequality. Of course, proper coordination
between the monetary wing and the fiscal wing of the government is necessary to achieve this; after
all, the decisions taken by the fiscal wing with respect to the transfer payment schedules has a strong
impact on the overall eﬀect of inflation on the economy. As an aside, the analysis also suggests the
deleterious eﬀect of inflation on the capital accumulation process (and on income distribution) may be
largely muted by appropriate rebating of the seigniorage revenue.
Many researchers, dating back to Ascheim (1959), and more recently, Haslag and Hein (1995) have
asked the question: does it matter how monetary policy is implemented. In other words, monetary
policy may be thought of as either aﬀecting the inflation tax rate (via the money growth rate) or
the inflation tax base (via changes in the reserve requirement). The question then becomes: are the
two instruments very diﬀerent in terms of their eﬀects on real variables in the economy? Consistent
with a popular view among central bankers and academics, it turns out the reserve requirement is
indeed a very “blunt” instrument in my model. For example, with the inflation rate fixed at 10%, an
increase in the reserve requirement from 10% to 20% in the no-transfers regime reduces the steady state
capital-labor ratio by almost 22%. Moreover, when monetary policy is implemented via changes in the
reserve requirement, from a steady-state comparison view-point, it appears that the transfers-to-workers
regime is “superior” to the no-transfers regime in that it produces a less-unequal income distribution
(both within capitalists and across capitalists and workers) without compromising on capital formation;
additionally, all capitalists and all workers prefer the transfers-to-workers regime in a stationary welfare
sense.
The paper makes contributions to several other strands in the literature. First, it adds to the
literature on the tax-related costs of inflation. In this paper, inflation acts as a tax on capital income
and therefore serves to raise the “eﬀective tax rate” on capital. The novelty is that a new cost has
been added to the list of items that are known to increase the eﬀective tax rate: the decline in the
availability of internal funds that gets reflected in higher economy-wide agency costs. Second, unlike
many models studying the welfare costs of inflation, this one is immune to the standard Lucas critique.
Here all financial contracts are endogenously derived and take account of changes in the government’s
monetary policy. It is important to point out here that the above results are established for an economy
in which nominal contracts are unimportant. In the real world, of course, inflation may have additional
eﬀects arising purely out of the non-indexed nature of many financial contracts. Moreover, if capital
income taxes are levied on nominal rather than real income, inflation may have an indirect eﬀect on
capital income tax rates (via the mechanism described earlier) that may exceed the more direct eﬀect.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section
3 outlines the environment while Section 4 discusses trade in the credit, labor, and capital markets.
Section 5 discusses the steady state distribution of bequests and income while Section 6 discusses the
determination of the steady state capital stock and the rate of interest. Section 7 contains the main
analytical results concerning the eﬀects of inflation on capital formation, and on the incomes of agents.
Section 8 studies the impact of various seigniorage rebate schemes using computational tools, Section 9
concludes the paper. The proofs of certain key results are collected in the appendices.
2 The related literature
The issues discussed in the current paper have antecedents from several diﬀerent strands in the literature
(see Romer and Romer, 1998 for a detailed survey.) I now discuss these in turn, with a view to isolating
the novel aspects of my approach.
There exists a large literature of suﬃcient vintage that addresses the issue of the impact of inflation
on the distribution of income and wealth. The standard “mainstream” argument (often summarized
as the Keynes-Fisher-Hamilton hypothesis) is that business firms which are net debtors, gain through
inflation. This is because many contractual arrangements are arguably fixed in nominal (dollar) terms.
Inflation reduces the real value of these nominal obligations thereby benefitting debtors and hurting
creditors. Similarly, inflation may transfer resources from workers to capitalists, if it is believed that
wages are set in nominal terms and inflation erodes their purchasing power. This set of hypotheses of
course relies on three critical assumptions. First, contracts must be set in nominal terms; second, firms
are net debtors, and third, all inflation must be unanticipated. Keynes also believed that even perfectly
anticipated inflation could act as a tax on the poor. This is possible if the “poor” are primary holders of
currency, while the “rich” hold indexed assets which allow them to largely avoid the inflation tax. This
paper studies an economy in which nominal contracts are unimportant in the sense that all contracts
that are indexed to perfectly anticipated inflation. Given that the eﬀects of unanticipated inflation is
well known, such a focus seems appropriate. In addition, since the financial contracts are endogenously
determined (and incorporate monetary policy parameters), the current model is immune to the Lucas
critique. Moreover, even though the actual brunt of the inflation tax is borne by the workers here, the
inflation-induced tax on capital income faced by capitalists is unavoidable and quite significant. [Boyd,
Levine, and Smith (2001)]
The relationship between inflation and credit market performance, long a favorite subject of research
in finance, has recently received a lot of attention in macroeconomics. In recent years, causal linkages
between inflation and financial market eﬃciency have been provided by Boyd, Choi, and Smith (1996)
and many others while Boyd, Levine, and Smith (1996), provide empirical support for the belief that
inflation and financial market activity might be negatively correlated. In the words of Boyd, Levine,
and Smith (2001), “...there is a significant and economically important negative relationship between
inflation and credit market activity”. In most of these models, financial markets allocate savings in
a world with informational asymmetries. Inflation worsens the severity of these information frictions
thereby hampering capital accumulation and growth. The paper that is closest in spirit to the present
paper is Huybens and Smith (1999), who among other things, are interested in explaining why inflation
and real activity might be negatively correlated in the long run. They employ a similar model where a
subset of agents need external finance to run their investment projects in the presence of a CSV problem.
There are two crucial diﬀerences between these papers. First, in their setup, capital and money coexist
because they bear the same rate of return while here, capital dominates money in rate of return and
money is held to satisfy a legal restriction. Second, in their model, the government plays a more limited
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role in that it only appropriates goods from the economy, and does not rebate them to the agents.3
There is ample evidence that points to a strong relationship between inflation (money growth rates)
and real activity. Khan, Senhadji, and Smith (2001) summarize the evidence as follows: “The empirical
evidence, particularly that based on time-averaged data, seems to suggest that even permanent and
predictable changes in the rate of inflation have real eﬀects.” Similarly, evidence on the negative eﬀects
of financial repression (which include large increases in the reserve requirements for banks) on real
activity, at least in developing countries, has been discussed in Bencivenga and Smith (1992).
In a recent paper, Heer and Su¨smuth (2003) study the eﬀect of inflation on the wealth distribution in
a general equilibrium multi-period overlapping generations model that is calibrated to the US economy.
In their model, poor agents accumulate savings in liquid assets, while rich agents participate in the
stock market. They find that an increase of inflation results in a lower stock market participation rate;
in addition, the distribution of wealth becomes more unequal. Romer and Romer (1998) find that low
inflation (and stable aggregate demand growth) are associated with “improved well-being of the poor
in the long run.”
The present analysis also shares some similarities with the literature on the Tobin eﬀect. In Tobin
(1965), an increase in the inflation rate reduces the real rate of return on currency thereby inducing
agents to switch to holding capital. There, increased inflation may actually increase capital accumu-
lation. It is important to note here that Tobin eﬀects are purely monetary in nature in that inflation
only aﬀects the return to money. In contrast, in my setup, inflation matters because it acts as a tax
on savers who then transfer the burden on to the borrowers. Thus inflation ends up acting as a tax
on capital income. Such tax-related costs of inflation may be especially relevant for those developing
countries who have large reserves to GDP ratios, and rely heavily on currency seigniorage. There is
a growing literature (see Feldstein, 1983, 1996 and Gravelle, 1994 among others) which focus on the
fact that inflation may increase the eﬀective tax rate on capital income. In that vein, the current
paper may be thought of as adding a previously unexplored cost of inflation: the added cost that is
borne by capitalists whose inheritance (and hence internal finance) is lower because of inflation. This
paper underscores the possible eﬀect of such inflation-induced capital income taxation on the income
distribution between capitalists as well as the income distribution between capitalists and workers.
Finally, there is a growing literature connecting changes in the income distribution to long run
output in an economy. Many of these papers make use of a credit market imperfection to induce
permanent eﬀects of changes in the income distribution on output. Foremost among these, are papers
by Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1991), and more recently, Matsuyama (2000), among
many others. Yet, almost all the papers in this literature do not explicitly model the credit market
friction or the environment in which the friction operates, and many do not derive the loan contracts
endogenously. Moreover, for reasons of tractability, many of them make assumptions (such as the open
economy assumption etc.) to ensure that interest rates remain fixed, thereby precluding any interesting
analysis of inflation in their models. Even though there is no “occupational choice” in my model, I am
able to overcome some of these aforementioned lacunae.
3 Environment
The model consists of an infinite sequence of two-period lived overlapping generations along the lines of
Diamond (1965).4 There is also a government that lives on forever. At the start of every period, a new
generation, consisting of a continuum of agents with measure one, is born. An exogenously specified
3The first of these diﬀerences is crucial in explaining why inflation necessarily has a negative eﬀect on long-run real
activity in their setup. The second diﬀerence precludes any analysis of income distribution in their paper which in any
case, is not their focus.
4The setup and notation here follows Bhattacharya (1998).
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fraction α of any generation is entrepreneurs or “capitalists”; the remainder is lenders or “workers”.
Capitalists, as a group, are distinguishable from workers in that they have exclusive access to one of
the capital investment technologies described below.
3.1 Endowments, technology, and preferences
In each period, there is a single final good, which may either be consumed, or invested in the production
of future capital. The final good is produced using a constant returns to scale technology with capital and
labor as inputs. If Kt is the time t capital stock and Lt is the time t quantity of labor employed, output
at t is given by F (Kt, Lt). Furthermore, let kt ≡ KtLt denote the capital-labor ratio and f(kt) ≡ F (kt, 1)
denote the intensive production function. The function f(.) is assumed to satisfy: f(0) = 0, f 0 > 0 >
f 00, and standard Inada conditions. Capital depreciates fully between dates.
I now describe the details of the “superior” capital production technology.5 Capitalists alone are
endowed with access to a stochastic linear technology (called project) that converts q units of the final
good at t into κ units of capital at t + 1. Each capitalist is endowed with exactly one such project.
Ownership of these projects cannot be traded and projects are indivisible, requiring exactly q units of
the final good to operate. The amount of capital produced next period is a discrete two-state random
variable, i.e., κ ∈ {κ1, κ2} with κ2 > κ1 ≥ 0. I refer to κ = κ2 as the “good” state and κ = κ1 as the
“bad” state. Let Prob {κ = κi} = πi ; i = 1, 2. Project returns are i.i.d across agents and time, and
the probability distribution of returns is time-invariant. There is no aggregate uncertainty.
With respect to information, all capitalists costlessly observe the realized return on their own
projects. However, any other agent (typically a lender) can observe the ex post return realization
on a project only by incurring a fixed cost of γ units of capital.6
There is also a second, inferior technology for producing capital that is available to all agents,
including workers. One unit of the final good invested in this inferior technology at t returns r ≥ 1
units of capital at t+ 1 with probability one.
Finally, there is a government that prints money. Let Mt denote the per capita stock of money
outstanding at the end of period t, ℘t denote the time t price level, and m ≡ M/℘ denote per capita
real balances. The government conducts its monetary policy by choosing the gross rate of money growth,
σ, once and for all in the first period. The money supply process is therefore described by
Mt+1 = σMt; σ ≥ 1, M0 > 0.
The seigniorage collected is then rebated back to the agents in a manner to be described below. For
now, assume that each capitalist potentially gets a lump sum transfer of amount Tc ≥ 0 and each worker
gets Tw ≥ 0. Also assume that the government makes no expenditures of its own.7
All agents are risk-neutral, and care only about old period consumption. As described earlier,
a capitalist also derives utility from leaving bequests to her oﬀspring.8 I assume that a capitalist
5The specifications of this technology closely follows Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bhattacharya (1998).
6The assumption that monitoring uses up capital yields a considerable simplification. The specification follows Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Boyd and Smith (1998), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) among others. Empirical backing for the
CSV story may be found in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997,1998).
7A side-issue that deserves mention here is the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy. If currency seignorage
is used to fund government purchases, and the latter has real eﬀects, then it is not clear whether the overall eﬀects of
inflation are the result of monetary action or fiscal policy. Since our focus is on the real eﬀects of monetary policy, it
is best to keep government purchases fixed (hold “fiscal policy constant”) and investigate the consequences of monetary
expansion. To that end, it is appropriate to set government expenditures to zero.
8Two points deserve mention here. First, bequests have been shown to be quantitatively quite significant in explaining
the intergenerational transmission of wealth. Kessler and Masson (1989) also document the dominant role of bequests in
capital formation. Second, allowing workers to leave bequests would not aﬀect the qualitative nature of the results that
follow.
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consuming ct when old, and leaving a bequest with a real value of bt, derives utility9 equal to
U(ct, bt) = min (ct, βbt), β > 0. (1)
4 Trade
4.1 Factor Markets
Young workers are endowed with one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically. They earn the
competitive real wage rate ωt at t where
ωt ≡ ω(kt) = f(kt)− ktf 0(kt); ω0(.) > 0 (2)
I assume that f is such that the resulting wage function is concave, or that
ω00(.) < 0 ∀kt. (A.1)
Capital is also traded in competitive markets and earns the rental rate of ρt at t where
ρt = f
0(kt). (3)
Since entrepreneurs have no labor endowment when young, and old workers are retired, clearly kt =
Kt/(1− α).
4.2 Credit Markets
Funds are available to capitalists from two sources; bequests left by the previous generation, if any, and
loans from workers. Lending by workers may be regarded as being intermediated. In other words, I
assume that there exists a financial intermediary that pools the young incomes of all workers and lends
on their behalf. For future reference, note that the entire deposit base of the bank is (1 − α)ω(kt).10
Credit issuance by the intermediary is subject to a currency reserve requirement, λ, which is set by the
government at time 0. More specifically,
m ≥ λ(1− α)ω(kt) (4)
must hold.11 This acts as a lower-bound restriction on the demand for real money balances in the
economy.
I also assume that there is an oversupply of loanable funds. This is implied by
αq ≤ (1− α) [ω(kt) + Tw] . (A.2)
9The introduction of bequests as a “warm glow” in the utility function is standard (see Galor and Zeira (1993) for
example). In the sequel, I will provide a precise characterization of the optimal loan contracts in the presence of an
information friction. To that end, all that is needed is that capitalists be risk neutral. The specific Leontief form of the
utility function is assumed solely for analytical simplicity.
10Since the transfer Tw is funded by the seigniorage, we assume it does not enter the reservable deposit base of the bank.
11Reserve requirements of this form are commonly employed across a vast cross section of countries. This “legal restric-
tion” is simply a convenient way to guarantee a positive demand for real balances even when currency is dominated in
rate of return. In our setting, this restriction is nothing more than a fairly standard cash-in-advance constraint. Huybens
and Smith (2001), somewhat unsatisfactorily, instead equate the returns to holding money and capital. Also note that
given our assumption that agents care only about old-age consumption, it is not possible to generate a positive demand
for money in our setup by introducing money into the utility function.
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Henceforth, I focus on k that satisfy (A.2). Assumption (A.2) rules out the possibility of credit rationing
and considerably simplifies the analysis. To foreshadow, any non-reserved funds remaining after all
lending to potential borrowers is completed, is invested in the inferior capital production technology.
Borrowers obtain credit by oﬀering loan contracts to lenders. Such contracts must (a) specify the
amount to be borrowed, (b) spell out a set of state-dependent payments to the lender, and (c) provide
a complete specification of how and when state verification will occur. Contracts specify a probability
pt ∈ [0, 1] that monitoring will occur if the borrower announces that the low return state has occurred.12
In addition contracts specify the amount retained by the borrower in the bad state in the event of an
audit, yat , as well as the amount retained in announced state i if no audit occurs, yit. Since in state i
the goods value of an investment is ρtκi, the payment to the lender in the event of an audit is ρtκi− yat ,
and the payment to a lender in state i if no audit occurs is ρtκi− yit.
A borrower with the ex post income level y chooses a consumption level, c, and a bequest, b, to
maximize U(c, b) = min (c, βb) subject to c+ b ≤ y. At an optimum, borrowers set c = βb and hence,
optimal consumption is c =
³
β
1+β
´
y. Thus the utility of a borrower, is a linear function of y given by
[β/(1 + β)]y.
If the inferior capital production technology dominates money in rate of return,
rρ >
℘t
℘t+1
(5)
holds; then the reserve requirement on the intermediary is binding, and (4) holds as an equality. I
focus on this situation throughout. The financial intermediary may therefore be thought of as holding
a portfolio (consisting of loans and reserves) with a weight of (1− λ) attached to loans, and a weight,
λ, attached to currency reserves.
Let Rt denote the (gross real) market rate of return charged on loans between t and t+1. Since (4)
holds with equality, I can rewrite the return on the bank’s portfolio as
h
λ
³
℘t
℘t+1
´
+ (1− λ)Rt
i
. Since
workers have access to the inferior technology, in equilibrium, it must be the case that their deposits
with the intermediary earn the same return as what they would have earned had they instead invested
their savings in the inferior technology. This implies that·
λ
µ
℘t
℘t+1
¶
+ (1− λ)Rt
¸
= rρt+1 (6)
must hold. In other words, if workers utilize the commonly available technology, the market return on
loans will be given by
Rt ≡ Rt (ρ;σ) =
rρt+1 − λ
³
℘t
℘t+1
´
1− λ .
It follows then that an increase in the inflation rate, ceteris paribus, causes R to rise. In other words,
lenders charge an inflation premium arising purely from the fact that they are forced to hold return-
dominated currency. As stated earlier, this premium is fully anticipated by all agents. Also notice that
the return to the inferior technology is assumed to be invariant to the inflation rate.
Borrowers announce contract terms, consisting of the vector (pt, yat , y1t, y2t) to maximize their
own expected utility, subject to a set of constraints described below. First, a borrower at t, with an
inheritance of bt−1, must raise (q− bt−1) units of funds externally. Announced loan contract terms must
yield a lender an expected return of Rt(q − bt−1). The pertinent constraint is
12Several points deserve mention here. First, following Williamson (1987), p may be interpreted as the probability of
bankruptcy. Second, the assumption of stochastic monitoring precludes the existence of standard debt contracts arising in
equilibrium. Third, Boyd and Smith (1994) show that, quantitatively speaking, the assumption of stochastic monitoring,
is not restrictive.
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π1{ρt+1κ1 − pt(yat + γ)− (1− pt)y1t}+ π2{ρt+1κ2 − y2t} ≥ Rt(q − bt−1 − Tc). (7)
Moreover, the borrower must have an incentive to announce truthfully when the good state has occurred.
The incentive constraint implied by this stricture is
(1− pt)(ρt+1κ2 − ρt+1κ1 + y1t) ≤ y2t. (8)
Finally, the borrower’s income must be non-negative, so that
yat ≥ 0, y1t ≥ 0, y2t ≥ 0,
must hold, along with pt ∈ [0, 1]. Since a borrower’s expected utility is simply proportional to
π1[ptyat + (1− pt)y1t] + π2y2t,
a borrower with an inherited bequest of bt−1 chooses a vector (pt, yat , y1t, y2t) to maximize this expression,
subject to (7), (8) and the “limited-liability” non-negativity constraints.
Two additional restrictions need to be imposed here. First, it is assumed that the superior investment
technology – inclusive of monitoring costs – yields an expected return superior to that on the inferior
technology, even if pt = 1. More specifically,
ρ [π2κ2 + π1κ1 − π1γ] > Rq. (A.3)
Second, I assume that
Rq > ρκ1. (A.4)
Assumption (A.4) guarantees that some monitoring occurs in the low return state.
Under the assumptions (5), (A.3) and (A.4), the following result is easily established.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium loan contract is defined by
pt =
Rt(q − bt−1 − Tc)− ρt+1κ1
π2ρt+1(κ2 − κ1)− π1ρt+1γ
(9)
ya1t = y1t = 0 (10)
y2t = ρt+1(1− pt)(κ2 − κ1). (11)
The proof of this result follows arguments presented in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and is hence
omitted. Some noteworthy features of the contract deserve mention here. The optimal contract mini-
mizes expected monitoring costs while ensuring the market return on loans to the lender. Unsuccessful
capitalists earn zero income. Additionally, note that the contractual arrangement is specified in real
terms. Also, inheritance plays an important role in determining the probability of bankruptcy for a
given firm; Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) provide evidence in support of this implication.
An additional implication of these contractual terms is that for a given level of bequest, b, an
increase in the market return on loans, R, increases the probability of being monitored if the capitalist
is unsuccessful. The intuition for this is simple: an increase in R reduces the payoﬀ to the borrower in
the good state making it more attractive to misreveal the state; hence she must be monitored with a
higher probability. Ceteris paribus, therefore, higher market return on loans imply a higher bankruptcy
probability (and higher auditing costs) and hence, lower credit market eﬃciency. Finally, note that
an increase in the level of bequest left by the previous generation, bt−1, ceteris paribus, reduces the
probability of being monitored, and raises y2t (the income of a successful capitalist who receives a
bequest bt−1). This link between bequests and credit market eﬃciency is explored more fully below.
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5 The Distribution of Bequests
Given the link between the volume of internal finance (bequests) and the costs of state verification (and
hence credit market eﬃciency) noted above, it is important to characterize the distribution of bequests
given a rate of return, ρ, on capital. Bequests are linked to a family’s success with the superior capital
production technology; families that have had a large string of “good draws” will leave large bequests
to their children who in turn will use these inheritances to attract better credit terms on the credit
market. To that end, let j denote the successive number of times the good state has been drawn within
a family since the last failure. Also let bj−1t−1 denote the level of bequests received at date t by an agent
whose parent is the family’s j − 1 th successive success. If successful, her second period income (from
Proposition 1) is yj2t = ρt+1(1 − p
j
t )(κ2 − κ1).13 She would then leave a bequest of b
j
t =
³
1
1+β
´
yj2t.
Therefore,
bjt =
µ
1
1 + β
¶
ρt+1(κ2 − κ1)
·
1− Rt(q − bt−1 − Tc)− ρt+1κ1
π2ρt+1(κ2 − κ1)− π1ρt+1γ
¸
. (12)
Equation (12) expresses the level of bequests left by a capitalist, if successful, as a function of the
bequests she received. It formalizes our earlier intuition that larger inheritances received tend to raise
the bequests left.14
5.1 Remarks
Several other implications of the analysis so far needs to be noted. First, the contract described in
Proposition 1 implies that, given ρ, an increase in the inflation rate raises R and hence raises p. In other
words, ceteris paribus, the model predicts a positive relationship between the bankruptcy rate and the
inflation rate. This prediction is in line with some scattered empirical evidence. For example, Wadhwani
(1986) using U.K data for 1964-81 finds “strong confirmation” for the hypothesis that higher inflation
is accompanied by an increase in the overall bankruptcy rate. Freixas et. al (1994) find evidence of a
similar link with more recent Spanish data.
Second, the model predicts that younger firms (those with low j indices) need more external funding
than those that are older. Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide evidence in support of this. As a corollary
to this, the model also predicts higher bankruptcy rates (higher p) for younger firms than older ones,
and this feature too is consistent with much evidence.15
5.2 The Distribution of Income
I concentrate on steady states below. Using Proposition 1, and for a given ρ, it is possible to formally
describe the steady state income of a capitalist who is the j th successive success in her lineage.16 Define
x ≡ π2(κ2 − κ1)− π1γ.
Lemma 1 Let
A ≡ A(ρ;σ) = (κ2 − κ1)
·
ρ− R (q − Tc)
x
+
ρκ1
x
¸
> 0
13Notice that, unlike in the setting explored by Carlstorm and Fuerst (1997), the bankruptcy probability here varies
across capitalists with diﬀering inherited wealths. In particular, oﬀspring of “rich” capitalist families face lower bankruptcy
probabilities.
14Kessler and Masson (1989) report that for France, 36% of the population receive any inheritances, and those who do,
are about 2.4 times richer than the representative household.
15For 1996, US data on bankruptcies reported in Dun and Bradsheet reveal that around 44% of all businesses aged five
years or less fail, as compared to 24% for businesses aged 6-10 years.
16Since unsuccessful capitalists earn zero income, I drop the i subscripts below.
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B ≡ B(ρ;σ) = R(κ2 − κ1)
(1 + β)x
> 0
and define y0 = 0. Then
yj = A+Byj−1. (13)
The proof of Lemma (1) follows straightforwardly from Proposition 1 and (9). The solution to (13)
describes the (partial equilibrium) steady state income distribution among capitalists. Equation (13)
links the income earned (in the event of a success) by a capitalist who is the jth success with her
immediate predecessor.
In order to validate the assumption that some amount of external finance is required for all capitalists,
or in other words, for q > bj for all j to hold, it is clearly necessary that
B < 1. (A.5)
Under Assumption (A.5), the solution to (13) is given by
yj =
µ
A
1−B
¶£
1−Bj
¤
; ∀j. (14)
Given the relative price of capital, ρ, (14) provides a complete description of the steady state distribution
of income among old capitalists. For future reference, note that firms that are the first success in a
lineage since the last failure earn an income A. 17 These will be among the youngest surviving firms. As
noted earlier, their “age” will also make them the most susceptible to bankruptcy in the credit market.
To foreshadow, inflation will have a stronger impact on these fledgling firms when compared to older
firms.
As stated above, I assume that no agent receives a large enough bequest to finance her project
without some external funding. Since an agent of index j receives a bequest of
³
1
1+β
´
yj , and since
yj ≤
³
A
1−B
´
∀j, this assumption is validated by the following condition:
q >
µ
1
1 + β
¶µ
A
1−B
¶
. (A.6)
In other words, project scale is large enough that all capitalists require some external funding. (A.6) is
maintained henceforth.
6 General Equilibrium
The intermediary’s per capita real holdings of money balances is computed from (4) at equality. Then,
the total amount of goods collected by the government via money creation is given by λ(1 − α)ω(k).
Suppose a fraction φ of these goods is transferred to the capitalists, i.e.,
αTc = φλ(1− α)ω(k).
It follows therefore that
(1− α)Tw = (1− φ)λ(1− α)ω(k).
17Those succeeding again will earn
³
A
1−B
´ ¡
1−B2
¢
and so on. Of course, the actual number of firms earning this income
will be less than the number of firms earning the income A.
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I now proceed to describe the determination of the equilibrium steady state capital stock and the
various factor prices. First note that in steady states, ℘t℘t+1 =
1
σ holds. Under (A.2), projects of all
capitalists are funded. Since the expected return on these projects is κ¯ ≡ π1κ1 + π2κ2, ακ¯ units of
capital are produced by capitalists, gross of monitoring costs.
The intermediary provides the external finance that capitalists require. Capitalists of index j − 1
receive a bequest of
³
1
1+β
´
yj−1, and hence require external finance in the amount of q −
³
1
1+β
´
yj−1.
Since the fraction of capitalists who are the j − 1 th successive success is given by π1(π2)j−1, the
aggregate amount of external funding required by capitalists (and, in the absence of credit rationing,
entirely supplied by the bank) is α
h
q − π1
P∞
j=1(π2)
j−1
³
1
1+β
´
yj−1
i
.
All worker savings in excess of the amount lent to capitalists (plus that which is held in the form
of money) is invested in the inferior capital production technology, yielding r units of capital per unit
invested. Since the total amount of loanable funds for the bank is (1− λ) (1 − α)ω(k) + (1 − α)Tw,
this form of investment yields r
h
(1− λ) (1− α)ω(k) + (1− α)Tw − αq + απ1
P∞
j=1(π2)
j−1
³
1
1+β
´
yj−1
i
units of capital each period, in a steady state.18
I now compute the amount of capital used up in the monitoring process in each period. As noted
previously, a fraction π1(π2)j−1 of capitalists have the index j − 1; they are monitored in their sec-
ond period (if unsuccessful) with probability pj . Let p denote the average probability with which any
capitalist is monitored. Then p is given by
p =
∞X
j=1
(1− π2)2(π2)j−1pj . (15)
Equation (9) gives an expression for the monitoring probability pj given a bequest level bj−1. Substituting
(9) into (15) and using bj−1 =
³
1
1+β
´
yj−1, the average monitoring probability satisfies
p =
1
x
∞X
j=1
(1− π2)2(π2)j−1
·
R (q − Tc)
ρ
− Ry
j−1
(1 + β)ρ
− κ1
¸
=
π1
x
·
R (q − Tc)
ρ
− κ1
¸
−
µ
1
1 + β
¶
π21R
xρ
∞X
j=1
(π2)j−1yj−1. (16)
Denote
ψ ≡ ψ (ρ;σ) =
π1
h
R(q−Tc)
ρ − κ1
i
x
, χ ≡ χ (ρ;σ) =
µ
1
1 + β
¶
π21R
xρ
and
H(ρ;σ) ≡
∞X
j=1
(π2)j−1yj−1 =
A(π2/π1)
(1− π2B)
> 0. (17)
Below, we show that the long-run mean income of all capitalists is given by π1H(ρ;σ). In a steady state,
p ≡ p(ρ;σ) = ψ − χH(ρ;σ) (18)
then defines the average “bankruptcy” probability among all capitalists in the economy. Of course,
p ∈ (0, 1) must hold in a valid equilibrium.
18The total amount of loanable funds available to the bank is given by (1− λ) (1−α)ω(k)+(1− φ)λ(1−α)ω(k).When
φ = 0, all the seigniorage is rebated back to the workers, implying that the amount of loanable funds is given by (1−α)ω(k),
the same as in a version of our economy with no money.
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The steady state aggregate capital stock is then given by the sum of capital produced by the
capitalists (net of monitoring costs) using the superior technology and the capital produced using the
inferior technology. In other words,
K = α[κ− π1γp(ρ;σ)] + r

(1− λ) (1− α)ω(k) + (1− α)Tw − αq + απ1
∞X
j=1
(π2)
j−1
µ
1
1 + β
¶
yj−1

 .
(19)
Dividing both sides of (19) by (1− α), noting that k ≡ K/(1− α), and using (17), I obtain
k =
µ
α
1− α
¶
[κ−π1γp(ρ;σ)]+
µ
r
1− α
¶
[(1− λ) (1−α)ω(k)+(1− φ)λ(1−α)ω(k)−αq+ απ1
1 + β
H(ρ;σ)].
(20)
For future reference, the size distribution of income among capitalists, in steady states, is completely
summarized by the sequence {yj}. The long-run mean income of all capitalists is given by
µ(ρ) =
∞X
j=1
π1π
j−1
2 y
j−1 =
π2A(ρ)
1− π2B(ρ)
= π1H(ρ;σ). (21)
The steady state income of all workers is trivially ω(k).
The model we have described above nests four interesting diﬀerent models depending on the treat-
ment accorded to any seigniorage revenue that is collected by the government. These are a) the model
with no reserve requirement (λ = 0) and hence no seigniorage, b) the model with no transfers (where
the seigniorage may be thought of as being discarded), c) the model where all the transfers go to the
workers, and finally d) the model where all the transfers go to the capitalists. The model with λ = 0
has been analyzed in some detail in Bhattacharya (1998). Given the richness of the structure, it is in
general impossible to algebraically characterize the analytics of the other models in general equilibrium.
Below, I report on some analytical progress in the study of the model with seigniorage but no transfers.
In the sequel, I will also report on the results of some illustrative numerical experiments conducted in
the last two models.
7 Analytics in the model with no transfers
We begin by reporting conditions under which there exists a unique stationary capital-labor ratio in
the model without transfers. Here, λ > 0 and σ > 1 and seigniorage is collected, but then discarded
[i.e., Tc = Tw = 0]. This is the only case analyzed in Huybens and Smith (1999).
Proposition 2 Suppose
³
1− qx
r
1−λ +
κ1
x
´
> 0, 1− r(1− λ)ω0(0) > 0, and that γ is suﬃciently small.
Then, there exists a unique solution to (20) and (3).
I now investigate the eﬀect of an increase in the rate of money creation (an increase in the steady
state inflation rate) on the steady state capital stock, and the incomes of workers and capitalists (as
a group). To presage, ceteris paribus, inflation forces the intermediary to charge capitalists a higher
real rate of interest on loans. This erodes the incomes of successful capitalists, which in turn causes
them to leave smaller bequests thereby impairing the ability of the next generation of capitalists to
provide internal finance for their capital investments. Consequently, the contracting friction becomes
more severe, agency costs rise, and the capital stock falls.
The eﬀects of an increase in the rate of money creation, σ, (and hence the steady state rate of
inflation) on the partial equilibrium average incomes of the capitalists, is summarized in the next
lemma.
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Lemma 2 Given a rental rate on capital ρ, an increase in the rate of money creation, σ, leads to a fall
in the average incomes of the capitalist class, i.e., π1
∂H(σ)
∂σ |ρ ≤ 0.
It is now possible to investigate the eﬀect of an increase in the steady state rate of inflation on the
partial equilibrium steady state capital stock.
Proposition 3 Given a rental rate on capital ρ, an increase in the rate of money creation, σ, leads to
a fall in the steady state capital-labor ratio, i.e.,
∂k(σ)
∂σ
|ρ ≤ 0.
Once ρ is allowed to change in response to a change in σ, it becomes impossible to analytically
characterize the overall eﬀect of inflation on the capital stock and on the distribution of income among
capitalists. From this point, I resort to numerical simulations. Below, I compare the eﬀects of inflation
on real variables in the aforementioned four models. The underlying mechanisms are clear. For a given
rental rate on capital, an increase in the money growth rate raises the “inflation premium” charged
by the bank, which as we have seen, erodes the incomes of capitalists as a group, thereby raising
the aggregate amount of resources that gets wasted in the monitoring process. On the one hand, the
transfer to the young capitalists reduces their need for external funds thereby reducing the severity of
the information friction (a reduction in aggregate monitoring costs). On the other hand, the government
transfer to young workers removes the eﬀect of the reserve requirement, restoring their savings to a level
identical to what is was in the benchmark setting with no money. Relative to a setting where capitalists
get all the transfer or seigniorage is discarded, this increases the availability of loanable funds on the
credit market thereby ameliorating the credit friction. The overall net eﬀect on the long run capital
stock, and hence on the income distribution between capitalists and workers is, in general, ambiguous.
8 Computational experiments
8.1 Changing the inflation rate
The parameters of the model economy are as follows: α = 10%, β = 10, λ = 17%, γ = 9.12, f(k) =
10k0.53, π1 = 0.430, π2 = 0.569, r = 1.016, q = 152.15, κ1 = 2.12, and κ2 = 339.12. Some statements
about the choice of these numbers for the model economy is in order.19 A choice of β = 10 implies
that parent-capitalists bequeath about 9% of their lifetime earnings to their children, which ties in well
with numbers reported in Altonji and Villaneuava (2002). While reserve requirements vary widely over
countries, quite a few of them (the U.S. included) use a legal reserve-ratio of near 10%, with a world
average of about 17% as reported in Click (1998). Boyd and Smith (1994) report that monitoring costs
(γ) is roughly 6% of the total assets (q) of the firm. They also use r = 1.016 as a risk-free return.
Denardi and Cagetti (2002), using Survey of Consumer Finances Data, find that entrepreneurs are
roughly 10% of the sampled population. The parameters chosen also imply that the ratio of seigniorage
revenue to GDP in the model economy stays near 2.0%. Click (1998) documents that between 1971-90,
in a wide cross-section of countries, currency seigniorage as percent of GDP ranged from 0.3% to 14%
with an average around 2%.
The results are reported in Figures 1 and 2 below. The inflation rate increases from 0% to 65%. Four
regimes are explored, the baseline (no money), the regime with positive seigniorage but no transfers, the
regime where all transfers go to workers, and finally, the regime where all transfers go to capitalists. In
the baseline regime, inflation, by definition has no eﬀect on any real variable. As the figures illustrate,
inflation raises real market return on loans (R) charged by the intermediary in each regime. The average
19The simulation results reported below are not intended to represent a full-blown calibration exercise. Such an exercise
would not be very illuminating in any case in a two-period OG model.
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monitoring probability, an estimate of the economy-wide “bankruptcy probability” rises in each case,
but the level is the lower in the transfers-to-capitalist regime than in the transfers-to-workers regime.
Transfers to capitalists enhance their internal net worth and this reduces their probability of being
monitored.
Within each regime, inflation causes a decline in real activity. The decline is lowest in the transfers-
to-workers regime because the transfer to the workers essentially nullifies the deleterious eﬀect of a
binding reserve requirement. There is still a small decline because even when the amount of loanable
funds is restored to the benchmark level, higher inflation continues to erode the incomes of capitalists
via its eﬀect on R. Relative to the regime in which all seigniorage is discarded, the capital stock is far
higher in either the transfers-to-capitalist regime or the transfers-to-workers regime.
It is interesting to note that inflation increases the income inequality (measured by the gini coef-
ficient) among all capitalists in each regime.20 Curiously, the eﬀect of inflation on income inequality
among capitalists is most muted in the transfers-to-workers regime. Similarly, the income gap be-
tween capitalists and workers (the ratio of average capitalist income to the wage rate) is highest in
the transfers-to-capitalist regime when compared to the transfers-to-workers regime. The steady state
welfare of workers (measured here as rρω (k)), not surprisingly, is highest in the transfers-to-workers
regime.
Overall, it seems that the importance of agency costs in the model economy is dwarfed by the eﬀect
of the aggregate supply of loanable funds. Put diﬀerently, the numerical analysis indicates that the
supply of loanable funds is, in some sense, more important for capital formation when compared to
policy-induced reductions in economy-wide agency costs.
Finally, at least from a steady-state (non-welfare) comparison view-point, it appears that the
transfers-to-workers regime is “superior” to the transfers-to-capitalist regime in that it produces a
less-unequal income distribution (both within capitalists and across capitalists and workers) without
compromising on capital formation.
8.2 Changing the reserve requirement
Many commentators, dating back to Ascheim (1959), and more recently, Haslag and Hein (1995) have
asked the question: does it matter how monetary policy is implemented. For example, in my setup,
monetary policy may be thought of as either aﬀecting the inflation tax rate (via the money growth rate)
or the inflation tax base (via changes in the reserve requirement). The question then is: are the two
instruments very diﬀerent in terms of their eﬀects on real variables in the economy?
I now report on the consequences of changing the reserve requirement, keeping the money growth rate
fixed. The parameters of the model economy are as follows: α = 11%, β = 10, γ = 5.6, f(k) = 10k0.54,
π1 = 0.5, π2 = 0.5, r = 1.016, q = 93.44, κ1 = 8.53, and κ2 = 235.73. The results are reported in Figure
3 below. The reserve requirement increases from 0% to 35%. Four regimes are explored, the baseline
(no money), the regime with positive seigniorage but no transfers, the regime where all transfers go to
workers, and finally, the regime where all transfers go to capitalists. In the regimes with valued money,
the money growth rate is held fixed at 10%. In each regime, increases in the reserve requirement causes
a decline in real activity. The decline is lowest in the transfers-to-workers regime because the transfer to
the workers essentially nullifies the deleterious eﬀect of a binding reserve requirement. Consistent with a
popular view among central bankers and academics, it turns out the reserve requirement is indeed a very
“blunt” instrument in my model. For example, with the inflation rate fixed at 10%, an increase in the
reserve requirement from 10% to 20% in the no-transfers regime reduces the steady state capital-labor
ratio by almost 22%.
20Our result on the connection between inflation and income inequality is strongly supported by evidence presented in
Al-Mahrubi (2000) and Bulir (2001) using cross section data for a large number of countries.
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It is interesting to note that increases in the reserve requirement, much like increases in the money
growth rate, increases the income inequality among all capitalists in each regime. Again, the eﬀect of
inflation on income inequality among capitalists is the least in the transfers-to-workers regime, and is
very high in the no-transfers and transfers-to-capitalist regime. Interestingly enough, the income gap
between capitalists and workers (the ratio of average capitalist income to the wage rate), for reserve
requirements above 25% is lower in the no-transfers regime than even in the baseline no-money regime.
The income gap is highest in the transfers-to-capitalist regime when compared to the transfers-to-workers
regime. The steady state welfare of workers, not surprisingly, is highest in the transfers-to-workers
regime.
Finally, I undertake a comparison between the no-transfers regime and the transfers-to-workers
regime as it pertains to welfare of individual capitalists. Fix the reserve requirement at λ = 0.35. Then,
it is clear from the figure that all the capitalists prefer the transfers-to-workers regime to the no-transfers
regime since each of their incomes is higher in the former regime. This was not the case in the case
where monetary policy was implemented via changes in the inflation rate. There, all capitalists always
(at even high inflation rates) preferred the no-transfers regime to the transfers-to-workers regime. It can
be easily checked that when monetary policy is implemented via changes in the reserve requirement, all
capitalists prefer the transfers-to-capitalist regime when compared to the transfers-to-workers regime.
In sum, when monetary policy is implemented via changes in the reserve requirement, from a steady-
state comparison view-point, it appears that the transfers-to-workers regime is “superior” to the no-
transfers regime in that it produces a less-unequal income distribution (both within capitalists and
across capitalists and workers) without compromising on capital formation; additionally, all capitalists
and all workers prefer the transfers-to-workers regime in a stationary welfare sense.
9 Conclusion
Recent times have witnessed a general tendency for worsening income inequities around the world. It
is also becoming increasingly clear that the distribution of income may have serious consequences for
the long-run level of real activity in an economy. A natural question that arises in this context is: does
activist government policy have any serious role in influencing the path for the distribution of income?
This paper is an attempt at answering such a question. I have developed a model in which expansionary
monetary policy aﬀects credit market eﬃciency, and via this link, capital accumulation and the incomes
(and welfare) of agents. Even perfectly anticipated monetary policy is shown to have eﬀects on long-run
real activity via changes in the “eﬀective tax rate” on capital incomes. Consequently, inflation aﬀects
the distribution of income. Somewhat surprisingly, a regime in which the revenue from the inflation tax
is rebated to the suppliers of loanable funds (as opposed to the producers of capital) produces a higher
level of long-run real activity and less income inequality when compared to other regimes.
In passing, I discuss two caveats. First, the analysis presented here is incapable of confronting
empirical evidence concerning “threshold eﬀects” of inflation: the eﬀects of inflation below and above
a certain threshold are supposedly very diﬀerent. Huybens and Smith (1999) produce a model that is
well-equipped to study this issue. Second, the current paper makes no attempt to study the short-run
eﬀects of inflation. Romer and Romer (1998) present evidence suggesting that the short run and the
long run relationship between monetary policy and income inequality go in “opposite directions”. The
present model is ill-suited to shed light on such a complex issue.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
I start by investigating the sign of H1(ρ;σ). From (17), straightforward diﬀerentiation yields
H1(ρ;σ) = (
π2
π1
)
·
1
{1− π2B(ρ;σ)}
¸2
[π2B1(ρ;σ)A(ρ;σ) +A1(ρ;σ) (1− π2B)] . (B.1)
It is easy to check that
R1(ρ;σ) =
µ
r
1− λ
¶
> 0
B1(ρ;σ) =
µ
κ2 − κ1
x(1 + β
¶
R1(ρ;σ) > 0
and
A1(ρ;σ) =
µ
1− q
x
r
1− λ +
κ1
x
¶
(κ2 − κ1)R1(ρ;σ) > 0
under the assumptions of the proposition. It follows from (B.1) that H1(ρ;σ) > 0. For future reference,
also note that
∂
∂ρ
µ
R
ρ
¶
=
µ
λ
1− λ
¶µ
1
ρ2σ
¶
> 0
χ1(ρ;σ) =
µ
1
1 + β
¶
π21
x
∂
∂ρ
µ
R
ρ
¶
> 0
and
ψ1(ρ;σ) =
π1q
x
∂
∂ρ
µ
R
ρ
¶
> 0.
I now turn to (19) and (20). Setting Tw = Tc = 0, it is possible to rewrite (20) as
k =
µ
α
1− α
¶
[κ− π1γp(ρ;σ)] +
µ
r
1− α
¶
[(1− λ) (1− α)ω(k)− αq + απ1
1 + β
H(ρ;σ)]
or,
k = V +Φ(ρ;σ) + r (1− λ)ω(k) (B.2)
where
V ≡
µ
α
1− α
¶
(κ− rq) > 0
and
Φ(ρ;σ) ≡
µ
απ1
1− α
¶·µ
r
1 + β
¶
H(ρ;σ) + γχ(ρ;σ)H(ρ;σ)− γψ(ρ;σ)
¸
.
Diﬀerentiating, I get
Φ1(ρ;σ) =
µ
απ1
1− α
¶·µ
r
1 + β
¶
H1(ρ;σ) + γχ1(ρ;σ)H(ρ;σ) + γχ(ρ;σ)H1(ρ;σ)− γψ1(ρ;σ)
¸
.
It is easy to verify that if γ → 0,Φ1(ρ;σ) ≥ 0 would hold, and therefore, by continuity, Φ1(ρ;σ) ≥ 0
holds for suﬃciently small γ.Also recall that ω0(.) > 0 implies that k − r(1 − λ)ω(k) > 0 holds under
the conditions of the proposition. Then, it follows that the right hand side of (B.2) is increasing in ρ.
This along with the fact that (3) is downward sloping completes the proof.
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B Proof of Lemma 2
For future reference, note that
R1(σ; ρ) =
µ
λ
1− λ
¶µ
1
σ2
¶
> 0
ψ1(σ; ρ) =
π1q
xρ
R1(σ; ρ) > 0 (C.0)
and
χ1(σ; ρ) =
µ
1
1 + β
¶
π21
xρ
R1(σ; ρ) > 0.
Also,
A1(σ; ρ) = (κ2 − κ1)
³
− q
x
´
R1(σ; ρ) < 0
and
B1(σ; ρ) =
(κ2 − κ1)
x(1 + β)
R1(σ; ρ) > 0.
It follows that A1(σ; ρ) = −(1 + β)qB1(σ; ρ). From (17), straightforward diﬀerentiation yields
H1(σ; ρ) = (
π2
π1
)
·
1
{1− π2B(σ; ρ)}
¸2
[π2B1(σ; ρ)A(σ; ρ) +A1(σ; ρ) (1− π2B)] . (C.1)
Now, [π2B1(σ; ρ)A(σ; ρ) +A1(σ; ρ) (1− π2B)] may be rewritten as£
π2B0A+A0 − π2BA0
¤
= π2B0A+ (π2B − 1)q(1 + β)B0
where the “0” denotes the partial derivative with respect to σ. I am interested in the sign of π2B0A +
(π2B−1)q(1+β)B0. To prove the result, I need this expression to be negative. Suppose, on the contrary,
the sign of π2B0A+ (π2B − 1)q(1 + β)B0 is positive. Then, it follows that
π2B0A− (1− π2B)q(1 + β)B0 > 0
or, since B0 > 0,
π2A− (1− π2B)q(1 + β) > 0
or,
q <
µ
1
1 + β
¶
π2A
(1− π2B)
From (A.6), we know, q >
³
1
1+β
´
A
1−B . This implies thatµ
1
1 + β
¶
A
1−B < q <
µ
1
1 + β
¶
π2A
1− π2B
should hold. In other words, µ
1
1 + β
¶
π2A
1− π2B
>
µ
1
1 + β
¶
A
1−B
should hold. This would imply
π2A− π2AB > A− π2AB
Since π2AB > 0, this implies
π2A−A > 0
should hold. SinceA > 0, and π2 < 1, we have the desired contradiction. Hence [π2B0A+A0 − π2BA0] <
0 holds and therefore it follows from (C.1) that H1(σ; ρ) ≤ 0 holds.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
Rewrite (20) as
k − r (1− λ)ω(k) =
µ
α
1− α
¶
[κ− rq]−
µ
α
1− α
¶
π1γp(σ; ρ) +
µ
α
1− α
¶
rπ1
1 + β
H(σ; ρ)]. (D.0)
Note that
p1(σ; ρ) = ψ1(σ; ρ)− χ1(σ; ρ)H(σ; ρ)− χH1(σ; ρ)
which is positive from (C.0) and Lemma 2. Then, assuming 1 − r(1 − λ)ω0(.) > 0, it follows that the
right hand side of (D.0) is falling in σ.
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Figure 1: Steady state consequences of changing the money growth rate
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Figure 2: Steady state consequences of changing the reserve requirement
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